Trust in compilers, code generators, and software verification tools

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Embedded Real Time Software and Systems, 2018-02-02
Development and verification tools

1940’s: hand-written machine code
Development and verification tools

1950’s: assembly languages + assemblers, linkers, autocoders
Development and verification tools

1960’s: higher-level languages + compilers
Development and verification tools

Simulation \[\rightarrow\] Simulink, Scade

Code generator

C / C++ / Ada

Compiler

Executable

Testing \[\rightarrow\] 1980’s: automatic code generation from models or declarative specs
Development and verification tools

- Simulation
- Model-checkers
- Program provers
- Static analyzers
- Testing

Simulink, Scade

C / C++ / Ada

Compiler

Executable

2000’s: tool-assisted formal verification
A panorama of verification tools

Static analyzers
Model checkers
Deductive program provers
Proof assistants

Static analysis: automatically infer simple properties of one variable ($x \in [N_1, N_2]$, $p$ points to $a$, etc) or several ($x + y \leq z$).
Model checking: automatically check that some “bad” program points are not reachable.
A panorama of verification tools

- Static analyzers
- Model checkers
- Deductive program provers
- Proof assistants

Program proof (Hoare logic, separation logic): show that
preconditions $\Rightarrow$ invariants $\Rightarrow$ postconditions
using automated theorem provers.
A panorama of verification tools

- Static analyzers
- Model checkers
- Deductive program provers
- Proof assistants

Proof assistants: conduct mathematical proofs in interaction with the user; re-check the proofs for correctness.
The long road to formal verification

From very early intuitions that there is something to be proved about computer programs...

Alan Turing, *Checking a large routine*, 1949.

(The first known example of loop invariants.)
The long road to formal verification

From very early intuitions that there is something to be proved about computer programs...

... to fundamental formalisms...

The long road to formal verification

From very early intuitions that there is something to be proved about computer programs...

... to fundamental formalisms ...

... to verification tools that automate these ideas ...

... to actual use in the critical software industry. (50 years later)
Trust in the development tools
The unsoundness risk: a verification tool could fail to account for all possible run-time states of the program, giving a false sense of safety.
The miscompilation risk: a compiler could generate bad code from a correct source program, invalidating all guarantees obtained by source-level formal verification.
NULLSTONE isolated defects [in integer division] in twelve of twenty commercially available compilers that were evaluated.

http://www.nullstone.com/htmls/category/divide.htm

We tested thirteen production-quality C compilers and, for each, found situations in which the compiler generated incorrect code for accessing volatile variables.

E. Eide & J. Regehr, EMSOFT 2008

To improve the quality of C compilers, we created Csmith, a randomized test-case generation tool, and spent three years using it to find compiler bugs. During this period we reported more than 325 previously unknown bugs to compiler developers. Every compiler we tested was found to crash and also to silently generate wrong code when presented with valid input.

X. Yang, Y. Chen, E. Eide & J. Regehr, PLDI 2011
Why is it so hard to compile and analyze correctly?

- **Algorithmic complexity** of compilers and analyzers. Ambitious optimizations; complex abstractions; SAT and SMT solving; etc.
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- **Structural complexity** of input data (= arbitrary programs). Some test suites for compilers, low coverage. No test suites of wrong programs for analyzers. Random differential testing as a substitute for proper tests.

- **Misunderstandings in the definition of the source language.** Esp. the C and C++ standards, which have many subtle points and 200+ undefined behaviors. Sometimes compiler writer misreads the standards. More often, an undefined behavior is compiled differently from expected by the programmer.
Silly compiler bugs

[Our] new method succeeded in finding bugs in the latter five (newer) versions of GCCs, in which the previous method detected no errors.

```c
int main (void)
{
    unsigned x = 2U;
    unsigned t = ((unsigned) -(x/2)) / 2;
    assert ( t != 2147483647 );
}
```

It turned out that [the program above] caused the same error on the GCCs of versions from at least 3.1.0 through 4.7.2, regardless of targets and optimization options.

E. Nagai, A. Hashimoto, N. Ishiura, SASIMI 2013
Misunderstandings: GCC bug #323

Title: optimized code gives strange floating point results.

#include <stdio.h>

void test(double x, double y)
{
    double y2 = x + 1.0; // computed in 80 bits, not rounded to 64 bits
    if (y != y2) printf("error!");
}

void main()
{
    double x = .012;
    double y = x + 1.0; // computed in 80 bits, rounded to 64 bits
    test(x, y);
}

Why it is a bug: ISO C allows intermediate results to be computed with excess precision, but requires them to be rounded at assignments.
Misunderstandings: GCC bug #323

Reported in 2000.

Dozens of duplicates.

More than 150 comments.

Still not acknowledged as a bug.


Responsible for PHP’s `strtod()` function not terminating on some inputs...

...causing denial of service on many Web sites.
Misunderstandings: a Linux bug

```c
struct sock *sk = tun->sk;
if (tun == NULL)
    return POLLERR;
/* write to address based on tun */
```

GCC removes the `tun == NULL` safety check, reasoning that if `tun` is `NULL` the memory access `tun->sk` is undefined behavior.

However, this code runs in the kernel, and the read `tun->sk` can succeed (without a kernel panic) even if `tun` is `NULL`.

Removing the `tun == NULL` check therefore opens an exploitable security hole, CVE-2009-1897.
Formal verification of tools

Testing tools to a high level of confidence is hard. Why not formally verify the compiler and the verification tools themselves? (using program proof)

After all, these tools have simple specifications:

Correct compiler: if compilation succeeds, the generated code behaves as prescribed by the semantics of the source program.

Sound verification tool: if the tool reports no alarms, all executions of the source program satisfy a given safety property.

As a corollary, we obtain:

The generated code satisfies the given safety property.
An old idea...

John McCarthy
James Painter

CORRECTNESS OF A COMPILER
FOR ARITHMETIC EXPRESSIONS

1. Introduction. This paper contains a proof of the correctness of a simple compiling algorithm for compiling arithmetic expressions into machine language.

The definition of correctness, the formalism used to express the description of source language, object language and compiler, and the methods of proof are all intended to serve as prototypes for the more complicated task of proving the correctness of usable compilers. The ultimate goal, as outlined in references [1], [2], [3] and [4] is to make it possible to use a computer to check proofs that compilers are correct.

Mathematical Aspects of Computer Science, 1967
3

Proving Compiler Correctness in a Mechanized Logic

R. Milner and R. Weyhrauch
Computer Science Department
Stanford University

Abstract
We discuss the task of machine-checking the proof of a simple compiling algorithm. The proof-checking program is LCF, an implementation of a logic for computable functions due to Dana Scott, in which the abstract syntax and extensional semantics of programming languages can be naturally expressed. The source language in our example is a simple ALGOL-like language with assignments, conditionals, whiles and compound statements. The target language is an assembly language for a machine with a pushdown store. Algebraic methods are used to give structure to the proof, which is presented only in outline. However, we present in full the expression-compiling part of the algorithm. More than half of the complete proof has been machine checked, and we anticipate no difficulty with the remainder. We discuss our experience in conducting the proof, which indicates that a large part of it may be automated to reduce the human contribution.

Machine Intelligence (7), 1972.
CompCert: a formally-verified C compiler
The CompCert project
(X.Leroy, S.Blazy, et al + AbsInt Gmbh)

Develop and prove correct a realistic compiler, usable for critical embedded software.

- Source language: a very large subset of C 99.
- Target language: PowerPC/ARM/RISC-V/x86 assembly.
- Generates reasonably compact and fast code
  ⇒ careful code generation; some optimizations.

Note: compiler written from scratch, along with its proof; not trying to prove an existing compiler.
The formally verified part of the compiler

- **CompCert C**: side-effects out of expressions
- **Clight**: type elimination, loop simplifications
- **C#minor**: stack allocation of “&” variables

**Optimizations**:
- constant prop., CSE, inlining, tail calls
- CFG construction
- expr. decomp.
- register allocation (IRC)
- calling conventions
- linearization of the CFG
- layout of stack frames
- asm code generation

**Asm**:
- RISC-V
- x86
- ARM
- PPC
Formally verified using Coq

The correctness proof (semantic preservation) for the compiler is entirely machine-checked, using the Coq proof assistant.

Theorem transf_c_program_preservation:
  \forall (p: Csyntax.program) (tp: Asm.program) (b: behavior),
  transf_c_program p = OK tp ->
  program_behaves (Asm.semantics tp) b ->
  \exists b', program_behaves (Csem.semantics p) b'
  \land behavior_improves b' b.

Shows refinement of observable behaviors $b$:
  - Reduction of internal nondeterminism
    (e.g. choose one evaluation order among the several allowed by C)
  - Replacement of run-time errors by more defined behaviors
    (e.g. optimize away a division by zero)
100,000 lines of Coq.

Including 15,000 lines of “source code” ($\approx$ 60,000 lines of Java).

6 person.years

Low proof automation (could be improved).
Programmed (mostly) in Coq

All the verified parts of the compiler are programmed directly in Coq’s specification language, using pure functional style.

- Monads to handle errors and mutable state.
- Purely functional data structures.

Coq’s extraction mechanism produces executable Caml code from these specifications.

Claim: purely functional programming is the shortest path to writing and proving a program.
The whole Compcert compiler

- **C source**: preprocessing, parsing, AST construction, type-checking, de-sugaring
- **AST C**:
- **AST Asm**: Register allocation, Code linearization heuristics, Valex translation validator
- **Assembly**: assembling, linking, printing of asm syntax
- **Executable**: Part of the TCB
- **Verified compiler**: Not proved (hand-written in Caml), Proved in Coq (extracted to Caml)

Part of the TCB
Not part of the TCB
Performance of generated code
(On a Power 7 processor)
WCET and stack use improvements on a real-time application

Daniel Kästner et al, CompCert: Practical experience on integrating and qualifying a formally verified optimizing compiler, ERTS 2018, session Fr1B.
Verasco: a formally-verified C static analyzer
Goal: develop and verify in Coq a realistic static analyzer by abstract interpretation:

- Language analyzed: the CompCert subset of C.
- Property established: absence of run-time errors (out-of-bound array accesses, null pointer dereferences, division by zero, etc).
- Nontrivial abstract domains, including relational domains.
- Modular architecture inspired from Astrée’s.
- Decent (but not great) alarm reporting.
Properties inferred by Verasco

Properties of a single variable / memory cell:  (value analysis)

- Variation intervals \( x \in [c_1; c_2] \)
- Integer congruences \( x \mod c_1 = c_2 \)
- Points-to and nonaliasing \( p \) pointsTo \( \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \)

Relations between variables:  (relational analysis)

- Polyhedra \( c_1x_1 + \cdots + c_nx_n \leq c \)
- Octagons \( \pm x_1 \pm x_2 \leq c \)
- Symbolic equalities \( x = expr \)
Architecture

CompCert compiler

source → C → Clight → C#minor → Cminor → ... → OK / Alarms

Control

Abstract interpreter

State

Memory & pointers abstraction

Numbers

\( \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \text{int} \)

Channel-based combination of domains

Convex polyhedra

Symbolic equalities

NR → R

Octagons

Integer & F.P. intervals

NR → R

Integer congruences
Proof methodology

The abstract interpretation framework, with some simplifications:

- Only prove the soundness of the analyzer, using the $\gamma$ half of Galois connections:

  $$\gamma : \text{abstract object} \rightarrow \wp(\text{concrete things})$$

- Don’t prove relative optimality of abstractions (the $\alpha$ half of Galois connections).

- Don’t prove termination of the analyzer.
Status of Verasco

It works!

- Fully proved (46,000 lines of Coq)
- Executable analyzer obtained by extraction.
- Able to show absence of run-time errors in small but nontrivial C programs.

It needs improving!

- Some loops need full unrolling (to show that an array is fully initialized at the end of a loop).
- Analysis is slow (e.g. 10 sec for 100 LOC).
Perspectives
Current status

Formal verification of development tools is just starting:

- CompCert is entering industrial use, with commercial support from AbsInt;
- Verasco is still at the advanced prototype stage.

However, these projects demonstrate that the formal verification of compilers, static analyzers, and related tools is feasible. (Within the limitations of today’s proof assistants.)
Future directions

- More assurance
- More optimizations
- Other verification tools
- Other source languages
- Connections w/ hardware verification
- Shared-memory concurrency
- Tool qualification

Other source languages besides C: reactive languages (Velus project), functional languages, Rust, . . .
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Other verification tools besides static analyzers: program provers, model checkers, SAT and SMT solvers
Future directions

Other verification tools

Other source languages

Connections w/ hardware verification

Shared-memory concurrency

Tool qualification

More assurance

More optimizations

Prove or validate more of the TCB: preprocessing, elaboration, …
Future directions

Other verification tools

Other source languages

Connections w/ hardware verification

Shared-memory concurrency

Tool qualification

More assurance

More optimizations

Add advanced optimizations, esp. loop optimizations.
Future directions

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Tool qualification

More assurance

More optimizations

How to leverage Coq proofs in a tool qualification?
See Kästner et al in session Fr1B for a IEC 60880 certification involving CompCert.
Future directions

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Race-free programs + concurrent separation logic
or: racy programs + hardware memory models a la C++11
Future directions

Formal specs for architectures & instruction sets, as the missing link between compiler verification and hardware verification.
In closing...

Critical software deserves the most trustworthy tools that computer science can produce.

Let’s make this a reality!